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THE PROPER STANDARD FOR RISK OF
FUTURE INJURY UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES




N July 26, 1992, the initial employment provisions of the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) became effective. 2 The ADA
protects individuals with disabilities3 from discrimination in em-
ployment, public services, public accommodations, and telecommunications.
The employment provisions of the ADA provide a cause of action to quali-
fied individuals with disabilities4 who have been discriminated against in em-
ployment decisions because of their disability.5 To be qualified, an
individual must be able to perform the essential functions of the position in
question.6
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
2. Id. § 1211 1(5)(A). July 26, 1992 marked the implementation of the first phase of the
ADA employment provisions in which employers with 25 or more employees are covered. Id.
On July 26, 1994, the law will become effective for employers with 15 or more employees. Id.
3. Under the ADA, a "disability" means, "with respect to an individual-(A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment." Id. § 12102(2).
4. The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires. For purposes of this title, consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for
the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of
the job.
Id. § 12111(8).
5. The ADA provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. See generally Kim
F. Ebert and Joseph M. Perkins, Jr., New Era of Employment Litigation: Overview of the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, 34 REs GESTAE 318, 318 (1991).
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8).
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Employers facing ADA claims have several potential defenses.7 At the
outset, an employer may claim that an employee (or applicant) is not quali-
fied, that is, he or she cannot perform the essential functions of the position.
Related to this position is the undue hardship defense. The ADA requires
employers to provide reasonable accommodation s to disabled persons, unless
doing so would be an undue hardship.9 An employer may claim that the
disabled person can only perform the essential functions of the job if pro-
vided an accommodation, but that requiring the employer to provide the
particular accommodation needed would pose an undue hardship. An em-
ployer may also assert a business necessity defense. Under this defense, the
employer must show that standards or selection criteria that tend to screen
out disabled persons are "job-related and consistent with business
necessity."1 0
An additional defense available to employers is based on safety concerns.
In some situations, a disabled individual who is fully capable of performing
the essential functions of a job will pose a risk to others or to the individual if
allowed to interact in the workplace. " Under previous legislation this situa-
tion has given rise to what has been termed the "safety defense.' 2
7. See generally HENRY H. PERRITr JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HAND-
BOOK § 4.23 (2d ed. 1991) (providing a general discussion of potential defenses).
8. According to the ADA, a "reasonable accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9).
9. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). An "undue hardship" is defined as:
(A) .. .[A]n action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when consid-
ered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).
(B) ... In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include-
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed
at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise
of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of
the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees;
the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geo-
graphic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities in question to the covered entity.
Id. § 12111(10). For an analysis of the balancing that occurs in the application of the undue
hardship defense with a particular emphasis on the role of economic efficiency, see Gregory S.
Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1 (1990).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a).
11. See Jana H. Carey, Employee Health and Safety Considerations: Recent Developments
on the Rights of The Handicapped, Disabled or Injured Worker, 398 PRAC. L. INST. 391, 395
(1990).
12. BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 5:15 (1991).
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This Comment examines the safety defense in the context of determining
which of two standards should be applied when the defense is invoked.
Should the standard be only one of "risk to others" where an employer will
have as a defense the fact that the applicant/employee poses a risk of injury
to other individuals? Or, should the standard further include a "risk-to-self"
aspect where an employer will have as a defense the fact that the appli-
cant/employee poses a risk of injury to himself or herself? The response to
these questions will determine whether an employer will be able to terminate
an employee or refuse to hire an applicant because that person may injure
himself or herself at some point in the future.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has adopted
the "risk-to-self" standard in implementing regulations for the ADA. 13 This
Comment argues that the risk-to-self standard is the incorrect standard for
the safety defense. This position is supported primarily by an analysis of the
ADA and its legislative history as well as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.14
Additional support is provided by an examination of safety-related cases de-
cided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,15 and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967.16 This Comment concludes that
the EEOC position should change or, in the alternative, that courts should
refuse to follow the regulations, choosing instead to adhere to the principles
behind the plain language of the ADA.
II. EEOC REGULATIONS
The EEOC is authorized to issue regulations for implementing and enforc-
ing the ADA.17 The EEOC's rules were promulgated in June of 1991.18
According to the EEOC, a valid defense may be that a qualification standard
that reduces, eliminates, or has a tendency to reduce or eliminate job oppor-
tunities of persons with disabilities is "job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity" and cannot be met notwithstanding the employer's
reasonable accommodation. 19 A " 'qualification standard' may include a re-
quirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1992). As discussed below, the EEOC takes the position that the
proper standard is one of risk-to-others and risk-to-self. See infra part II. The EEOC claims
that its position is supported by "the legislative history of the ADA and the case law interpret-
ing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act [of 1973]." Equal Employment Opportunity for
Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,730 (1991) [hereinafter EEOC Final
Rule] (includes comments and interpretive material of EEOC).
14. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796i (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).
16. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12116.
18. EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,726. In developing the regulations, the EEOC
followed a typical course of action. In August of 1990, the EEOC published a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, indicating its desire to obtain comments from those interested. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities, Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,192 (1990) (announced Aug. 1, 1990). The EEOC then pub-
lished a proposed rule, again inviting interested parties to comment. Equal Employment Op-
portunity for Individuals With Disabilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg.
8578 (1991) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991) [hereinafter Proposed Regulations].
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1) (1992).
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safety of the individual or others in the workplace." 20 Therefore, in order for
an employer to successfully maintain this defense, it must demonstrate that
the applicant or employee in question fails to meet a "qualification stan-
dard." This qualification standard must be imposed by the employer to ex-
clude from employment any applicant or employee who would pose a
"direct threat" to the safety of the individual or to others in the workplace.2'
Furthermore, the qualification standard must be "job-related and consistent
with business necessity" and unable to be met by an employee even after
reasonable accommodation is provided.
Allowing an employer to discriminate against persons who would pose a
direct threat of harm to fellow employees is not controversial and no courts
have found it inappropriate. 22 Rather, the trouble with the regulations lies
in their inclusion of the risk-to-self standard. As will be discussed in more
detail, neither the language of the ADA nor its legislative history justifies
allowing employers to use risk to self as a defense. Furthermore, there are
20. Id. § 1630.15(b)(2) (emphasis added). A "direct threat" is defined as:
[A] significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual
or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.
The determination that an individual poses a 'direct threat' shall be based on an
individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the
essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable
medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on
the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual
would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
21. It is interesting to note that in the proposed regulations, the discussion of a qualifica-
tion standard precluding a direct threat was contained in the general discussion of qualification
standards rather than under the employer's defenses. Proposed Regulations, supra note 18, at
8590. This was construed by some disability groups to mean that the plaintiff would be re-
quired to demonstrate that he or she did not pose a direct threat as part of the plaintiff's case
in chief. EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,731. To avoid this confusion, EEOC moved
the reference to the defense portion consistent with its location in the ADA. Id.
22. While there are disagreements among courts over the particular degree of risk that
must be shown, there is apparently no opposition to the risk-to-others standard. On the con-
trary, the development of law concerning communicable diseases demonstrates complete ac-
ceptance of a risk-to-others standard. For example, the ADA provides:
In any case in which an individual has an infectious or communicable disease
that is transmitted to others through the handling of food... and which cannot
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, a covered entity may refuse to as-
sign or continue to assign such individual to a job involving food handling.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(d)(2).
Also, the communicable disease cases clearly demonstrate that courts, including the
Supreme Court, wholeheartedly accept a risk-to-others standard. See School Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987) (examining employment protection of tuberculosis infected teacher under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in the context of the teacher's risk to others with whom she was
likely to come in contact). See infra part IV.B.3.b. Finally, there are compelling policy rea-
sons to embrace a risk-to-others standard. Perhaps the most compelling is society's interest in
protecting innocent and disinterested parties. This interest seems to clearly justify allowing an
employer to refuse to hire anyone-not just a disabled person-who poses a substantial risk of
harm to a customer or co-worker.
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many convincing policy arguments against a risk-to-self standard and the
few policy arguments in favor of the standard can be thoroughly refuted.
After the EEOC's proposed rule was published, disability groups com-
plained that a direct threat should not include any reference to the disabled
individual's health or safety because such a standard would result in deci-
sions "based on negative stereotypes and paternalistic views about what is
best for individuals with disabilities."'2 3 While the EEOC acknowledged and
attempted to manage the problem of negative stereotype based decisions, 24 it
completely failed to address the problem of the paternalistic nature of the
regulations. On the contrary, the EEOC has adopted a regulation that ex-
ceeds its authority and should, therefore, be rejected by the courts.
While considerable weight is given to an agency's interpretation of a stat-
ute,25 "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construc-
tion and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent."' 26 In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 27 Justice
Marshall, speaking for the Court, stated that "[c]ourts need not defer to an
23. EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,730. In the alternative, disability groups asked
EEOC to at least clarify that the "assessment of risk must be based on the individual's present
condition and not on speculation about the individual's future condition." Id.
24. See id. In response to the fears about decisions being made based on negative stereo-
types, the EEOC made changes in five areas. First, the EEOC added language to the definition
of direct threat to indicate that while there is a threshold level of risk beyond which one may
not advance, the risk does not have to be eliminated, just reduced to a level below that thresh-
old. Id. at 35,736, 35,739.
Second, the EEOC amended its interpretive comments "to highlight the individualized na-
ture of the direct threat assessment." Id. at 35,730. In doing so, the EEOC clarified that
medical evidence is not the only relevant evidence to the determination of the existence of a
direct threat. On the contrary, relevant evidence will include "input from the individual with a
disability, the experience of the individual with a disability in previous similar positions" and
various opinions of disability experts. Id at 35,745.
Third, the EEOC clarified that the decision as to the existence of a direct threat is to be
based on the "individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job."
Id. at 35,730, 35,736 (emphasis added). Thus, an employer appears to be precluded from
considering the possibility that the employee, while fully able to perform the job at the time of
hiring, may be unable to do so even in the near future.
Fourth, the EEOC also amended the definition of direct threat, adding "[t]he imminence of
the potential harm" to the factors to be considered. Id at 35,730, 35,736. It is not clear,
however, how much actual difference there is between the third factor-the likelihood of the
potential harm occurring-and the imminence of the potential harm.
Fifth, the EEOC also emphasized in its interpretive comments that the direct threat defini-
tion applies to all persons, not just disabled individuals. Id. at 35,730, 35,745. With regard to
this aspect, the reasoning is unclear because it is difficult to conceive of a risk to self existing
absent a disability. See supra note 3 for the broad definitions of disability under the ADA. In
other words, this aspect is probably mere rhetoric because a situation in which a non-disabled
individual poses such a risk to himself or herself is highly unlikely to ever arise. Of course,
there may be certain jobs where such a risk is inherent no matter what the physical capabilities
of the employees. In this situation, the mandate of equal application would prevent the em-
ployer from imposing anything other than a risk-to-self qualification standard since the em-
ployer would be required to apply it to all applicants. Consequently the employer would never
find a qualified person for the position.
25. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984); see also Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
109 (1991) (discussing various mechanisms used to challenge agency regulations).
26. Chevron, US.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).
27. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
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administrative construction of a statute where there are 'compelling indica-
tions that it is wrong.' "28 The Court subsequently refused to follow EEOC
regulations in General Electric, Inc. v. Gilbert.29 Thus, while it is general
practice for courts to follow agency regulations, they are required to adhere
to congressional intent on the issue to be decided.
The current test for determining the validity of an agency's interpretation
of a statute is stated in Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. ,30 and was recently reaffirmed in Rust v. Sullivan.31 Under the
Chevron test, the court asks two questions. First, the court determines
whether Congress has spoken on the "precise question at issue."' 32 If Con-
gress has addressed the specific issue at hand, then the inquiry is completed
and both the court and the agency are required to adhere to that intent. 33 If
the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the determination of the issue, how-
ever, the court moves to the second question, which is whether the agency's
interpretation is based on a permissible, or reasonable, interpretation. 34
An examination of the plain language and legislative history of the ADA
shows that Congress has spoken on the precise issue at hand in this case:
whether the safety threat discussed in the statute includes a risk-to-self stan-
dard. Even if a court were to find that the ADA was ambiguous on this
point, the analysis will show that the EEOC interpretation is not a permissi-
ble or reasonable one and must fail under the second question. Therefore,
under Chevron and Rust, courts will be required to reject the EEOC's inter-
pretation of this aspect of the ADA.
III. LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ADA
In examining the validity of the standard, the obvious starting point is the
language and legislative history of the ADA itself. An examination of the
relevant sections and legislative history of the ADA leads to the conclusion
that the ADA was not intended to allow employers to use risk to self as a
defense. On the contrary, the language and legislative history of the ADA
demonstrate that the statute does indeed operate "on the premise that an
individual with a disability, when fully apprised of a potential risk [where]
the risk is only of future harm to herself, is capable of deciding for herself
28. Id. at 94-95 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
29. 429 U.S. 125, 143-45 (1976) (rejecting the argument that employer's benefit plan dis-
criminated against women on the basis of sex in failing to provide coverage for pregnancy
related disabilities); see also Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 706 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (refus-
ing to adhere to regulations issued by the Department of Labor regarding wage and hour
issues), aff'd, 918 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1990).
30. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
31. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The precise issue in Chevron concerned the definition of a
term which Congress had not explicitly defined. Id. at 841. Similarly, the ADA issue turns on
the definition of terms-"qualification standard" and "direct threat." In this situation, how-
ever, Congress did define the term and in doing so only included the risk-to-others standard.
See infra part III.
33. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
34. Id. at 843, 845.
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whether or not to submit to the risk." 35
Section 103 of the ADA, concerning defenses to a charge of discrimina-
tion, makes it clear that an employer may impose qualification standards
related to safety. Under this provision, "[tihe term 'qualification standards'
may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."' 36 Recall, how-
ever, that the EEOC's statement of the defense includes approval for "a re-
quirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of the individual or others."' 37 The ADA's definition of direct threat in
section 101 is "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 38 Likewise, this should be
compared to the EEOC's statement of the definition as the risk applying to
"the [disabled] individual or others."' 39 Comparing the language of the stat-
ute to that used by the EEOC strongly supports the notion that the safety
defense was intended to apply only in the context of a risk to others. Con-
gress must have been aware of the obvious differences between standards of
risk-to-self and risk-to-others and yet, Congress explicitly referred only to
other individuals.4° Had Congress intended the safety defense to include a
risk-to-self standard, it would have added the few words necessary to make
that intention clear.
The legislative history of the ADA also supports the argument that the
risk-to-self standard is improper. The report from the House Committee on
Education and Labor4l states that it is acceptable for an employer to "deny
35. Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1991).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b) (emphasis added). Section 103 also provides that for a qualifi-
cation standard to be a valid defense, it must be "job-related and consistent with business
necessity," and cannot be met notwithstanding reasonable accommodation by the employer.
Id. § 12113(a). This aspect of the regulations is consistent with the statute.
The interpretive guidelines to the Regulations state that an employer must show a direct
threat "in order to show that the requirement is job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity." EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,752 (emphasis added). This statement could be
read as indicating that when an employer demonstrates the existence of a direct threat, the
qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity, i.e., that the elimi-
nation of direct threats is always job-related and consistent with business necessity. This is
clearly not the case and may simply be the result of ambiguous wording by the EEOC. The
business necessity defense requires that a particular qualification standard must be job-related
and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a). A qualification standard may
include a prohibition on hiring individuals who pose a direct threat. Id. § 12113(b). Demon-
strating the existence of a direct threat merely proves that a requirement may be considered as
a qualification standard in asking the business necessity question. It does not automatically
demonstrate that the qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business
necessity.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (emphasis added).
38. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(3) (emphasis added).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b).
41. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 300 [hereinafter HOUSE LABOR REPORT]. The House of Representatives
jointly referred the House version of the ADA to four committees: the Committees on Educa-
tion and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Public Works and Transportation and the Judiciary.
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employment to an applicant or to fire an employee with a disability on the
basis that the individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others
or poses a direct threat to property. '42 Moreover, the underlying theme
throughout both the House Labor Report and the Senate Labor Report, as
well as the statute, is that a standard that excludes or tends to exclude dis-
abled persons is only legitimate if it is job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.43 This factor makes it clear that a risk-of-self defense could
not have been intended, because such a standard could not meet the business
necessity test and, at the same time, abide by other statutory limits on the
employer.
The risk-to-self standard is consistent with business necessity only when it
is invoked for financial reasons. This could arise in one of two situations.
First, the failure to use a risk-to-self standard could result in increased insur-
ance cost to the employer. Second, the failure to use a risk-to-self standard
could lead to increased employment costs in hiring and training replacement
employees to perform the job on which the disabled person was injured.
Although it is conceivable that one or both of these situations may arise,
the ADA and the regulations appear to foreclose any possibility of either
situation causing legitimate employer concerns in the context of an employer
deciding whether or not to hire a disabled person. With regard to increased
insurance costs, the EEOC stated that the determination of whether one is
qualified is to be made without concern for a potential of increased health
Id. at 1. Because the focus of this Comment is on the ADA's application in the employment
context, the Report of the Committee on Education and Labor is discussed as the primary
source of legislative history from the House.
The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1989, S.
REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter SENATE LABOR REPORT], Was sub-
mitted prior to the House Labor Report. Much of the language is similar if not identical.
42. HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 56; see SENATE LABOR REPORT, supra note
41, at 27. Note that this reference to a direct threat to property did not appear in the final
language of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113 (b). However, its presence provides the opportu-
nity for a court to interpret the term "others" to include the property of others. This reference
to damage to property tends to discredit the following example of an application of the risk-to-
self standard offered by the EEOC:
[A]n employer would not be required to hire an individual, disabled by narco-
lepsy, who frequently and unexpectedly loses consciousness for a carpentry job
the essential functions of which require the use of power saws and other danger-
ous equipment, where no accommodation exists that will reduce or eliminate the
risk.
EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,745. In such a situation, it is a safe assumption that the
possibility is just as high that damage will be done to other persons, including the property of
other persons, in the workplace as to the disabled individual. Therefore, such a situation could
be precluded based on the risk of harm to others, thus rendering the risk-to-self standard
unnecessary in that context.
43. See HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 71; see SENATE LABOR REPORT, supra
note 41, at 37. Note also that the "exception to the general rule [against medical examina-
tions] meets the employer's need to discover possible disabilities that do, in fact, limit the
person's ability to do the job, i.e., those that are job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity." HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 73 (emphasis added); see SENATE LABOR
REPORT, supra note 41, at 39.
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insurance costs.44 Furthermore, the House Labor Report emphasized that
"an employer could not deny a qualified applicant a job... because of the
increased costs of the insurance." '
45
Consideration of the costs that may result from a currently qualified em-
ployee's inability to perform at some point in the future also appears to be
prohibited under the ADA. The EEOC stated that the determination of
whether one is qualified "should not be based on speculation that the em-
ployee may become unable in the future." 46 Again, the House Labor Report
supports this statement. "The term 'qualified' refers to whether the individ-
ual is qualified at the time of the job action in question; the possibility of
future incapacity does not by itself render the person not qualified."
47
Therefore, the ADA forecloses consideration of the only two factors that
could make a risk-to-self standard job-related and consistent with business
necessity. Consequently, the risk-to-self standard would be incorrect even if
the EEOC definitions of direct threat and qualification standard were
correct.48
Moreover, absent these two justifications, the only remaining theoretical
ground for an employer to espouse a risk-to-self standard is a general con-
cern and benevolence for the applicant, a person who, prior to submitting an
application for employment, will often be completely unknown to the em-
ployer. Of course, this same situation could arise where an existing em-
ployee is injured and returns to work disabled. In that case, the employee
will be known to the employer. It is questionable whether most businesses
have any interest or concern in applicants or employees beyond the financial
aspects already discussed. While there may be particular persons acting in
supervisory roles for the business who do have a genuine concern, the busi-
ness as an entity presumably exists for profit and does not need to be con-
cerned that an employee is injured, except insofar as potential financial
liability could result. Giving employers the benefit of the doubt, assume that
the business is truly interested in the welfare and health of employees, an
assumption that may well be true for many employers. This genuine con-
cern does not alter the impropriety of the risk-to-self standard because the
decision of whether to accept risks involved with a job is one that is properly
made by the disabled individual.49
By permitting an employer to use a risk-to-self standard to exclude dis-
44. EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,743. As to specific costs of workers' compen-
sation and direct employer liability, see infra part VII.
45. HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 136; see also SENATE LABOR REPORT,
supra note 41, at 85. It may be argued that this refers only to the general increase in insurance
rates that is likely to result when disabled persons are employed and not to a specific increase
in insurance rates, especially workers' compensation rates, that may result after a claim is filed.
However, there does not appear to be any basis for making such a distinction.
46. EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,743.
47. HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 55; see also Senate LABOR REPORT, supra
note 41, at 26.
48. Cost is, however, a proper consideration in the determination of whether a reasonable
accommodation imposes an undue hardship on an employer. Crespi, supra note 9, at 823.
49. See Burnwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
965 (1981). "if ... personal compassion can be attributed to corporate policy it is commenda-
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abled individuals, the EEOC allows an employer to circumvent the statute.
In claiming a benevolent concern for applicants, an employer is allowed to
achieve goals indirectly that the statute prohibits: consideration of increases
in insurance rates and future inability to perform the job. An employer is
permitted to substitute the business' risk aversion for that of a disabled em-
ployee who is probably less risk averse because he or she is accustomed to
the increased risk concomitant with a particular disability. In doing so, the
employer is most likely concerned about the effect that a person's potential
injuries could have on the business vis-a-vis insurance or tort liability rather
than about the injuries per se. Thus, the EEOC permits employers to evade
the dictates of the ADA.
The House Labor Report also states that "[a] physical or mental employ-
ment criterion can be used to disqualify a person with a disability only if [it]
has a direct impact on the ability of the person to do their actual job duties
without imminent substantial threat of harm." 50 This statement follows the
statement that "[p]aternalism is perhaps the most pervasive form of discrim-
ination for people with disabilities and has been a major barrier to such indi-
viduals."5 1 Because these two statements appear together, it could be argued
that the word "harm" includes harm to the disabled individual.
If these two sentences are read in isolation from the full text, this argu-
ment appears to have merit. But, when they are read in context, and in
conjunction with the statute, it becomes clear that the word "harm" is in-
tended to refer to harm to others. The more logical reading is that harm is a
reference to aspects other than personal harm, specifically, the explicitly
mentioned harm to others or harm to property. If the Committee had in-
tended the word "harm" to refer to harm to oneself, it could have easily
stated "harm to the individual" instead of merely "harm." Moreover, any
inferences that could be drawn from these statements read in isolation are
refuted by the explicit reference in the ADA to risk to others, as well as
other statements in the legislative history that foreclose use of a risk-to-self
standard. 52
Further support for the congressional position against a risk-to-self stan-
dard is found in the floor debates. A statement by Senator Kennedy, a co-
sponsor of the Senate bill, makes clear that the direct threat standard is not
meant to provide employers with a risk-to-self defense. Kennedy stated:
The ADA provides that a valid qualification standard is that a person
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace-that is, to other coworkers or customers. A specific deci-
sion was made to state clearly in the statute that, as a defense, an em-
ble, but in the area of civil rights, personal risk decisions not affecting business operations are
best left to individuals who are the targets of discrimination." Id. at 371.
50. HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 74.
51. Id.
52. It does appear that the Committee would allow the exclusion of individuals based on
risks to their own safety when the employer is otherwise required to follow health standards
set out by other statutes enacted for the protection of employees. See HOUSE LABOR REPORT,
supra note 41, at 74 (reference to the OSHA lead standard). However, this does not weaken
the argument against a risk-to-self standard since it is not explicitly provided for in the ADA.
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ployer could prove that an applicant or employee posed a significant
risk to the health or safety of others, which could not be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation.... It is important, however, that the ADA
specifically refers to health and safety threats to others. Under the ADA,
employers may not deny a person an employment opportunity based on
paternalistic concerns regarding the person's health. For example, an
employer could not use as an excuse for not hiring a person with HIV
disease the claim that the employer was simply "protecting the individ-
ual" from opportunistic diseases to which the individual might be ex-
posed. That is a concern that should rightfully be dealt with by the
individual, in consultation with his or her private physician. 53
There is no statement to the contrary in the record either prior or subse-
quent to Kennedy's statement. This further supports the position that Con-
gress intended to provide employers with a direct threat defense based on
risk to others but not on risk to self.
In conclusion, the language and legislative history together do not sup-
port, and in fact prohibit, use of a risk-to-self standard. The statute explic-
itly mentions a risk to others but does not mention a risk to self. The
legislative history, while not as clear, also fails to mention a risk-to-self de-
fense. The risk-to-self standard conflicts with the structure and spirit of the
ADA. The plain language of the statute, the legislative history, and com-
mon sense permit only one reasonable construction: risk to self is not a valid
defense.
IV. REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
A. RELEVANCE OF REHABILITATION ACT TO THIS ANALYSIS
The Rehabilitation Act of 197354 provides protection to "handicapped" 55
individuals in various situations. Section 501(b) requires federal agencies to
promulgate and maintain affirmative action plans for the hiring of handi-
capped persons. 56 Section 503(a) requires most federal contractors to take
53. 136 CONG. REC. S9,684 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (em-
phasis added).
54. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796i (West 1985 & Supp. 1992). For a general discussion of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see Richard F. Richards, Handicap Discrimination in Employment:
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 39 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1985).
In addition to the federal protection of the disabled, various states have enacted laws prohib-
iting discrimination on the basis of a persons status as disabled. Carey, supra note 11, at 395;
BRUCE D. SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW, 1 LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLICY,
158-62 (Joel Feinberg et al. eds., 1982).
55. The Rehabilitation Act uses terminology regarding "handicapped" individuals
throughout. The term "disability" in the ADA is intended to be comparable to the term
"handicap" in the the Rehabilitation Act. HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 50. The
use of disability rather than handicap "represents an effort . . .to make use of up-to-date,
currently accepted terminology." SENATE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 21.
56. 29 U.S.C.A. § 791(b) (West Supp. 1992). Section 501(b) provides in part: "Each de-
partment, agency, and instrumentality (including the United States Postal Service and the Pos-
tal Rate commission) in the executive branch shall . . . submit . . . an affirmative action
program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with handicaps in
such department, agency, or instrumentality." Id.
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affirmative action to hire handicapped persons.7 Section 504(a) prohibits
discrimination against handicapped persons in employment decisions by
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance or conducted by
an executive agency or the postal service.58
Despite minor differences in language, the ADA covers the same individ-
uals that are covered under the Rehabilitation Act, but expands the scope of
employers covered. 59 The Rehabilitation Act protects "handicapped" per-
sons, while the ADA protects "disabled" persons. The definitions of these
persons are almost identical. 60 The major difference between the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the ADA, with regard to employment, is the scope of employ-
ers covered by each statute. Indeed, "[t]he overall effect of the ADA's
employment-related provisions is to extend and amplify the nondiscrimina-
tion protections which were previously only available [to some] under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973."6 1
57. Id. § 793(a). Section 503(a) provides:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (in-
cluding construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring
that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with
the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employ-
ment qualified individuals with handicaps as defined in section 706(7) of this
title. The provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of
$2,500 entered in to by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the
procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construc-
tion for the United States).
Id.
58. Id. § 794(a). Section 504(a) provides:
No otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps in the United States, as de-
fined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service.
Id.
The nondiscrimination provision of ADA is most similar to section 504(a). Section 102(a)
of the ADA provides:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp. 1992).
59. Kathleen D. Henry, Civil Rights and the Disabled: A Comparison of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Employment Setting, 54
ALB. L. REV. 123, 128 (1989); RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS OF THE AMER-
ICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND IMPLEMENTING EEOC REGULATIONS 101 (1991)
[hereinafter RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA].
60. A "disabled" person under the ADA is one who has (i) "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;" (ii)
"a record of such an impairment;" or (iii) one who is "regarded as having such an impair-
ment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1992). Under the Rehabilitation Act, a handi-
capped person is one "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
61. RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, supra note 59, 101 at 3. See HOUSE LABOR
REPORT, supra note 41, at 23 (noting that "[t]he ADA incorporates many of the standards of
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In addition to claiming support in the legislative history of the ADA, the
EEOC claims that a risk-to-self standard is supported by "the case law inter-
preting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act [of 1973]. "162 Therefore, the
next logical area of law to examine is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. This
examination will show that the law concerning the proper standard is
conflicting.
B. REHABILITATION AcT CASE LAW
1. Introduction
As previously noted, section 504 is the provision of the Rehabilitation Act
most similar to the employment aspects of the ADA. 63 Therefore, section
504 will be the primary topic of consideration within the discussion of the
Rehabilitation Act. The safety defense arises under the "otherwise quali-
fied" prong of the Rehabilitation Act.64 This aspect of the safety defense
appears not to have changed under the ADA. Since the defense is a claim
that a disabled person fails to meet a qualification standard established by an
employer, the defense is an assertion that one is not qualified to perform the
job. 65 Because the defense is likely to be one portion of the qualification
determination, it may be helpful to consider the basic meaning of "otherwise
qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act.
2. Otherwise Qualified
The Supreme Court defined "otherwise qualified" in Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis,66 the first case in which the Court interpreted sec-
tion 504.67 The case involved a hearing impaired plaintiff's attempt to be
admitted to a registered nurse program at Southeastern Community College.
She had been rejected by Southeastern for the stated reason that she was not
discrimination set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973"); see also SENATE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 10.
62. EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,730.
63. In order to make a case under Section 504, the plaintiff must show "(1) that he is a
'handicapped individual' under the Act, (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the position
sought, (3) that he was excluded from the position sought solely by reason of [the] handicap,
and (4) that the program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance." Strathie
v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983). Similarly, under the ADA, a
plaintiff is required to show that he or she (1) is disabled; (2) is qualified for the particular job
in question; (3) was discriminated against with regard to an employment decision because of a
disability; and that (4) the defendant is a covered entity. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp.
1992); see also PERRITT, supra note 7, § 1.2.
64. TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5:15 (noting that a "relevant factor in the
otherwise qualified analysis involves safety"); Richards, supra note 54, at 24-25 (discussing the
safety issue under heading regarding otherwise qualified); Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act After Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 845, 899 (1989) (under the safety defense if an employee cannot perform the essential
tasks safely, then the employee is not otherwise qualified).
65. Although, as previously discussed, lack of risk to self or others is not an aspect of
being qualified that the plaintiff will have to prove as part of his or her case. See supra note 21
(concerning the placement of the "qualification standard" discussion under defenses by the
statute and later the EEOC).
66. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
67. Id. at 405.
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qualified. 68 The Court affirmed the district court's ruling that Davis was not
qualified, stating that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. '69 The Court
indicated that there are two aspects to the notion of being otherwise quali-
fied. First, a person must be able to meet a program's "technical standards,"
meaning those "essential to participation."' 70 Second, and actually a part of
the first, the plaintiff must meet any "legitimate physical qualifications" that
are "essential to participation."' 71 Davis was disqualified on this second
prong since she could not perform the duties of the program and still insure
patient safety. 72
The problem with the Court's definition of "otherwise qualified" is two-
fold. First, the term is inherently ambiguous. The term could mean, as the
Court asserted, that a person must be qualified notwithstanding his or her
handicap. 73 Alternatively, the term could mean that a person is qualified
except for those limits imposed by the disability itself, as the court of appeals
maintained. 74 There is no real reason for deciding that one interpretation is
more "correct" than the other.
Second, if the Court's definition ("able to meet all of a program's require-
ments in spite of [the] handicap" 75) were read literally, it would mean that
one must meet a program's requirements, regardless of the usefulness or the
arbitrary nature of such requirements.76 The remaining text of the opinion
demonstrates, however, that the requirement is actually that one must be
"able to meet all the reasonable (and thus nondiscriminatory) physical and
mental requirements of a program in spite of [the] handicap."'77 These issues
68. Id. at 401-02.
69. Id. at 406.
70. Id. at 407.
71. 442 U.S. at 407.
72. Id. at 409. Much of the debate in Davis concerned what, if any, accommodation the
Rehabilitation Act required the college to provide Davis. If the Act required an accommoda-
tion, then she may have been qualified once that accommodation was factored in. If the Act
did not require an accommodation, then whether she would have been qualified with an ac-
commodation was irrelevant. The court held that the only accommodation that would render
Davis qualified would require a "fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program" and
thus was not required. Id. at 410.
73. See Judith W. Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal
Opportunity Without Respect To Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 456 (1984).
74. See 442 U.S. at 406.
75. Id.
76. See Richards, supra note 54, at 22.
77. Id. As Richards points out, this reading was confirmed by the Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), where the Court stated:
Davis thus struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to
be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in pre-
serving the integrity of their programs: while a grantee need not be required to
make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to accommodate the handi-
capped, it may be required to make 'reasonable' ones.
Id. at 300.
A subsequent Fifth Circuit case summarizes the effect of Alexander well.
After Alexander it is clear that the phrase 'otherwise qualified' has a paradoxical
quality; on the one hand, it refers to a person who has the abilities or character-
istics sought by the grantee; but on the other, it cannot refer only to those al-
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have apparently been settled under the ADA. Section 101(8) defines a
"qualified individual with a disability" as one who "with or without reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires."178 Thus, the Davis holding
survives, though whether one meets the program's requirements will be con-
sidered in light of any reasonable accommodation that can be provided to
the plaintiff.
3. Standard Under the Rehabilitation Act Case Law79
Determining the proper standard under the Rehabilitation Act is quite
difficult. In short, different courts adopt different standards. Therefore,
while these cases are certainly not irrelevant, there is no one discernible rule
that can be derived so that one arguing for or against any particular stan-
dard can claim the selection of that standard to be settled under the Act. To
demonstrate this point, a discussion of various cases selecting one standard
or another is provided below.
a. Risk-to-Self Cases
Very few courts adopt the risk-to-self standard alone. The Second Circuit
adopted a risk-to-self standard in Kampmeier v. Nyquist.80 Kampmeier in-
volved a preliminary injunction requested by two junior high school stu-
dents, each with vision in only one eye, preventing their schools from
denying them the opportunity to participate in contact sports.81 The court
ready capable of meeting all the requirements--or else no reasonable
requirement could ever violate § 504, no matter how easy it would be to accom-
modate handicapped individuals who cannot fulfill it. This means that we can
no longer take literally the [definition in Davis]. The question after Alexander is
the rather mushy one of whether some 'reasonable accommodation' is available
to satisfy the legitimate interests of both the grantee and the handicapped
person.
Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261-62 (5th Cir. 1988).
78. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8).
79. It should be stated at the outset that the degree of risk required under a given risk
standard is not at issue here; rather what is at issue is the propriety of a given standard-the
risk-to-self standard. With regard to the degree of risk which must be shown, many courts
define the issue narrowly in the case of the risk-to-self standard. TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 12, at.5:18; see also Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621
(9th Cir. 1982) (requiring "rigorous scrutiny"). The EEOC Regulations are in accord with
this approach. "The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high
probability of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient." EEOC Final Rule,
supra note 13, at 35,745. Those same courts allow more room for the employer's interests
when applying the risk-to-others standard. TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5:19; see
also Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 233 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying an
"appreciable risk" standard). Regardless of the standard applied, courts require true evidence
of the risk. Employers cannot rely on stereotypical generalizations about a particular
handicap. Carter v. Casa Cent., 849 F.2d 1048, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that Section
504 was designed to counteract reliance on generalizations and stereotypes); see also Smith v.
Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 32 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 986, 990 (C.D. Cal.
1983) ("The fear of hiring the handicapped merely transfers real or imagined costs on the
handicapped which is contrary to the Act.").
80. 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
81. Id. at 298.
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upheld the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction. 82 The court
found a "substantial justification" in the schools' policies since there was
evidence of a "high risk of eye injury" involved in the sports that was not
refuted by any evidence presented by the plaintiffs. 83
The language in this decision appears to provide strong support for a risk-
to-self standard. This case, however, involved children, over whom state
schools have traditionally exercised a paternal power. Indeed, on this basis,
the court distinguished its decision from a case offered by the plaintiffs in
which the court granted a preliminary injunction allowing a university stu-
dent with one eye to play basketball on the grounds that "the student was
old enough to weigh the risks and make the decision for himself."'84
One of the most discussed risk-to-self cases is Bentivegna v. United States
Department of Labor,85 in which the City of Los Angeles denied Bentivegna
employment on the basis of his diabetic condition. The City argued that a
blood sugar test demonstrated lack of control and that, consequently, per-
forming the job posed a risk of future injury to Bentivegna. 6 The court
relied on regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act that al-
lowed an exclusionary criteria only if it was "consistent with business neces-
sity and safe performance." '87 The court read the statement regarding safe
performance as concerning safety to the employee but refused to exclude
Bentivegna, stating that for the risk to exclude him, "it must be directly
connected with, and must substantially promote, 'business necessity and safe
performance.' "88 The court acknowledged that because many handicapped
persons will be subject to a higher risk of injuries resulting from employ-
ment, qualifications based on risk to self must be examined with strict scru-
tiny; otherwise, the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act would be
circumvented. 89 Thus, while the court accepted a risk-to-self standard as
being permissible, it imposed a strict standard on the showing that must be
made for an employer to succeed under the safety defense.90
b. Risk-to-Others Cases
Many courts have adopted a risk-to-others standard. Recall that in South-
82. Id. at 300.
83. Id. at 299.
84. 553 F.2d at 300 n.9; see also Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948,
954 (D.N.J. 1980) (holding that the school had no right to deny participation in school wres-
tling to handicapped student once it was aware that the student's parents consented to and
encouraged his participation).
85. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
86. Id. at 620-21.
87. Id. at 621 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b)).
88. Id. at 622.
89. Id.
90. One commentator stated that "[w]hile Bentivegna's stringent standards are a step in
the right direction, they do not go far enough" and advocates a "virtually certain" standard
whereby an adult handicapped person would not be denied a job based on the risk of future
injury unless it was virtually certain that an injury would occur. Tucker, supra note 64, at 899.
This standard is but one more step in the right direction, however, still hesitating short of the
proper standard. A disabled adult should never be denied a position based on risk of future
injury when the adult is aware of and assumes the risk of such injury.
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eastern Community College v. Davis,9 1 the reason that Davis was disqualified
was that she could not perform her duties in a way that would insure patient
safety. 92 A risk-to-others standard was also applied in Strathie v. Depart-
ment of Transportation,93 in which a hearing-impaired school bus driver
brought suit claiming that the state's licensing requirements violated the Re-
habilitation Act.94 The court examined the case in the context of risk to
others. The court found that for each risk allegedly posed by Strathie driv-
ing a school bus, a reasonable accommodation was available that eliminated
the risk.95 Therefore, after reasonable accommodation was provided, any
risk to others was eliminated. While the court could have also examined the
case under a risk-to-self standard because there was also a risk to the driver,
it chose not to do so.
Numerous cases adopting the risk-to-others standard involve the potential
transmission of communicable diseases. The leading case in this area is
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.96 Arline involved a school teacher
who was discharged because she experienced recurring tuberculosis infec-
tions. After concluding that one suffering from a contagious disease is in-
deed handicapped, 9 7 the Supreme Court moved to the question of whether
Arline was otherwise qualified.
The Court acknowledged that the school had a legitimate interest in not
exposing other persons to health and safety hazards.98 The Court stated that
in assessing the significance of the risk the following factors should be
considered:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the dura-
tion of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the
risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabili-
ties the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of
91. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
92. Id at 409.
93. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 229. The regulation in question required that a licensee have "[n]o hearing loss
greater than 25 decibels at frequencies of 500, 1,000 and 2,000 in the better ear, without a
hearing aid." Id. at 228. Strathie required a hearing aid to meet these requirements.
95. Id. at 232-34.
96. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
97. Id. at 281. The Court stated:
Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impair-
ment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of § 504, which is to ensure
that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others. By amending the definition of
'handicapped individual' to include not only those who are actually physically
impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are
substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that soci-
ety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicap-
ping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment .... The
fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose a serious health
threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify excluding from the
coverage of the Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases.
Id. at 284-85.




After applying these factors, the Court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to determine if Arline was otherwise qualified. 1°°
Significantly, this analysis has also been applied to cases involving the
transmission of AIDS. 10 1 In Chalk v. United States District Court, Central
District of California,0 2 a teacher was reassigned to an administrative posi-
tion after being diagnosed with AIDS. The court applied the four factors
applied in Arline and determined that Chalk did not pose a significant risk
and therefore reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction.
Arline and Chalk are fully representative of the many cases applying a risk-
to-others standard in the context of the transmission of a communicable
disease. 10 3
c. Risk-to-Self-and-Others Cases
Many courts adopt a risk-to-self and risk-to-others standard. The Ninth
Circuit applied a standard of risk-to-others-or-self in Mantolete v. Bolger, a
section 501 case. 10 4 Mantolete, an epileptic, was denied the position of
machine distribution clerk with the United States Postal Service on safety
grounds. Specifically, the Post Office asserted that as a result of her epileptic
condition, and the nature of the sorter machine with which she would be in
constant contact, she posed a risk of injury to herself.'0 5 The court accepted
the proposition that "in some cases a job requirement that screens out quali-
fied handicapped individuals on the basis of possible future injury, could be
both consistent with business necessity and the safe performance of the
job,"' 1 6 which is to read "safe performance" as applying to the handicapped
person and, presumably, to others.'0 7 The court relied on the EEOC's regu-
99. Id. at 288 (quoting the Brief for the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae,
at 19).
100. Id. at 288.
101. See generally Judith J. Morrell, Note, Aids and Cancer: Critical Employment Discrimi-
nation Issues, 15 J. CORP. L. 849 (1990) (discussing the application of the Arline standard to
AIDS discrimination); Tracy J. Smith, Aids and the Law: Protecting the HIV-Infected Em-
ployee from Discrimination, 57 TENN. L. REV. 539 (1990) (discussing the application of the
Arline standard to AIDS discrimination).
102. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. See also Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying risk-to-others
standard to policy of segregating HIV positive prison inmates from other inmates); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979) (risk-to-others stan-
dard for communicable disease); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp.
440 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (risk-to-others standard for AIDS); Ray v. Sch. Dist. of DeSoto County,
666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (risk-to-others standard for HIV); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) (risk-to-
others standard for HIV); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp 376 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (risk-to-others standard for AIDS).
104. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 1419-20.
106. Id. at 1422.
107. Justice Rafeedie, in a concurring opinion, criticized the court for not elaborating on its
acceptance of the risk-to-self standard, though noting that this position was consistent with the
court's earlier opinion in Bentivegna. Id. at 1425 (Rafeedie, J., concurring).
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lations under section 501.108 The court remanded for the district court to
consider whether there was evidence of a "reasonable probability of substan-
tial harm."' 1 9
Another example of a court's application of the risk-to-self or others stan-
dard is provided by Sharon v. Larson.110 In that case, the plaintiff chal-
lenged Pennsylvania's prohibition against using bioptic lenses to satisfy the
visual requirements for receiving a drivers license."' The court stated the
test as one of risk to self or others 1 2 and found the plaintiff disqualified
because of her risk to herself.113 In doing so, the court relied on Strathie.
However, as discussed above, the court in Strathie used a risk-to-others
test. 114 Since driving an automobile without adequate visual capabilities cre-
ates a certain risk to others, the court unnecessarily expanded Strathie to
apply to risk to self.
The Fifth Circuit recently applied a risk-to-self-or-others test in Chiari v.
City of League City."15 The city terminated Chiari, a sixty-six-year-old engi-
neer, who suffered from Parkinson's disease, from his position as a construc-
tion inspector based on a perceived safety risk resulting from the ailment."16
The city justified its action based on the "concern that his loss of balance
[resulting from Parkinson's disease] would endanger him and others work-
ing with him."' ' 17 Chiari argued that there was no danger to others and that
risk to self was not a proper consideration." 8
The Fifth Circuit rejected Chiari's argument. Unlike many courts, how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit attempted to provide support for its position in ac-
cepting the risk-to-self prong of the standard. The court relied on the
EEOC's regulations enforcing section 501, which espouse a risk-to-self-or-
others standard, and the Mantolete decision to establish that section 501 in-
cludes a risk-to-self standard. 119 Since section 501 included a risk-to-self
component, the court held that section 504 must also include such a compo-
nent. 120 "Therefore, under § 504, an individual is not qualified for a job if
there is a genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could
injure others, and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that
risk."121
While the court attempted to justify its position, the matters on which it
108. Id. at 1421 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703).
109. Id. at 1424.
110. 650 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
111. Id. at 1397. Bioptic lenses create a large blind spot when driving an automobile. Id.
at 1399.
112. Id. at 1402.
113. Id. at 1403.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
115. 920 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1991).
116. Id. at 313.
117. Id. at 315-16.
118. Id. at 316.
119. Id. at 317 (discussing 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1990)); see Mantolete v. Bolger, 767
F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).




relied did not provide adequate support. The Mantolete decision relied on
the same EEOC regulations, and thus, those regulations are the sole support
provided for a risk-to-self standard. Reliance on these regulations is proba-
bly inadequate in the context of the Rehabilitation Act but is certainly inade-
quate in the case of the ADA regulations, since it is nearly identical language
used by the same agency that is being contested. This case applies the ra-
tionale that the EEOC's selection of the risk-to-self standard makes that
standard correct. While this case uses stronger language and is more direct
in attacking the issue, it is no more persuasive that the risk-to-self standard
should apply than the cases that fail to directly address the issue. 122
Of course, it could be argued that since the court's basis was not merely
the language of the EEOC regulation involved, but also the acceptance and
application of the language by other courts, the case does provide support
for applying the risk-to-self standard in the context of the ADA. This argu-
ment raises questions regarding the extent to which cases interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act should be relied on by courts interpreting the ADA.
There are real differences between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act that
preclude an intellectually honest reliance on the cases as conclusive sup-
port. 23 This issue, however, need not be resolved to determine that a risk-
to-self standard is inappropriate, because even if substantial weight is given
to these decisions, it is clear from this discussion that the cases are contradic-
tory and exhibit no pattern of distinction with regard to why a given stan-
dard is better or worse than another. There are cases here that support the
position of the EEOC. There are also cases that support the position of this
Comment. Neither position is fully supported by the case law and both posi-
tions can cite cases with an opposing viewpoint.
In passing the ADA, Congress must have been aware of these conflicting
decisions. It must have known that some courts applied the risk-to-self de-
fense and others did not. Yet, Congress only included the risk-to-others de-
fense. Since Congress must have been aware of a conflict between the two
122. See also Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981) (medical school's re-
fusal to readmit former student with a history of mental illness was justified based on risk-to-
self-and-others standard); Wallace v. Veterans' Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988) (reg-
istered nurse who was a former drug addict was precluded from administering narcotics and
therefore not a risk to others); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd without
op., 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989) (FBI's exclusion of insulin-dependent diabetics was justified
based on a risk-to-self and risk-to-others standard); Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 619 F. Supp.
1191 (D.D.C. 1985) (airline's policy of refusing to allow blind persons to sit in an emergency
exit row seat was not in violation of the Rehabilitation Act based on risk-to-self and risk-to-
others standard).
123. See Cooper, supra note 35, at 1424.
Although Congress clearly relied upon the regulations implemented under the
Rehabilitation Act in drafting the ADA, the ADA's statutory language and ex-
tensive legislative history suggest that Congress intended to modify the Rehabili-
tation Act's approach to employment discrimination in subtle but significant
ways .... [I]f the courts are to take seriously Congress's expressed intent to
provide equal employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities, the
courts must not apply Rehabilitation Act precedent to the ADA uncritically,
but instead must recognize the ways in which Congress's expressed intent differs
from the approach taken by the courts under ... the Rehabilitation Act.
Id. at 1426.
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standards and only placed one of those standards in the ADA, Congress
could not have intended the other standard to be applicable. Indeed, Con-
gress could not have done much more to demonstrate its intent that the risk-
to-self defense not be allowed.
In conclusion, either because of the differences between the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act or because the case law is far from conclusive on the
matter, the EEOC cannot rely on these cases to support its adoption of the
risk-to-self standard. The other primary support for the EEOC's position is
the statute itself. This reliance has also been demonstrated to be inappropri-
ate because the plain language and legislative history of ADA demonstrate
that the congressional intent was to deny employers the risk-to-self defense.
In addition, an examination of other legislation and cases concerning safety
matters will demonstrate the existence of a basic policy in favor of allowing
individuals to choose their own risks. A risk-to-self defense defeats this
policy.
V. THE POLICY FAVORING INDIVIDUAL SELECTION OF RISK
A. SELECTION OF RISK AND OTHER FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
The basic principle that a person should be allowed to choose the risk
associated with employment is supported by cases decided under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)1 24 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 25 These cases generally adopt a risk-to-
others standard in the context of whether particular qualification standards
meet the test of either a bona fide occupational qualification126 (BFOQ) or a
business necessity. 2 7 Clearly, the fact that one standard is adopted under
one statute is not determinative of the proper standard under another stat-
ute. In this case, however, the similarities between the statutes warrant an
inquiry into how similar issues have been decided. Of course, this is also
true with regard to the Rehabilitation Act. Cases under Title VII and
ADEA have, however, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, developed clear princi-
ples for dealing with the safety issue.
The similarities between the three statutes are fairly obvious. Title VII,
ADEA, and ADA are all designed to eradicate discrimination based on
physical (as well as mental in the case of ADA) characteristics. In all three,
the safety issue arises when the argument is made that because of a person's
characteristics (sex, age, or disability) he or she cannot safely perform the
job in question. The issue here is whether "safely" should refer to risks to
others, to the protected individual, or both. The case law establishes that in
124. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).
125. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
126. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1).
127. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The business necessity defense in
Title VII cases has now been codified. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991).
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the case of Title VII and ADEA the proper standard is risk-to-others. In
cases where a person poses a risk to himself or herself because of a physical
characteristic, the individual is the one who decides whether to bear the risk,
not the employer.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the context of ADEA in West-
ern Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell.128 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged a rule
requiring flight engineers to retire at age sixty as violating ADEA. Western
Air Lines defended the rule as a BFOQ adopted for safety reasons. After
stating the test for BFOQ in this situation,1 29 the Court upheld the jury's
verdict that the rule was not justified as a BFOQ for safety purposes. Of
importance here is that the Court and jury looked at safety factors con-
cerned with the safety of persons other than the individual employees. As
the Court speaks in general terms of safety, passenger safety and public
safety, it could be argued that the plaintiff-employees are passengers and part
of the public, and, therefore, risk to self is considered. However, a full read-
ing of the opinion, as well as other courts' interpretations of Criswell,130
makes clear that the safety concern was for persons other than the plaintiff-
employees. 131
In Dothard v. Rawlinson 132 the Supreme Court addressed the relationship
between safety and gender requirements. Dothard involved minimum height
and weight requirements established by Alabama for its correctional facility
officers as well as an explicit prohibition on employing females in certain
positions involving significant contact with male prisoners. The gender re-
quirement was defended as a BFOQ adopted for safety purposes. The Court
accepted the defense and upheld the gender requirement as a BFOQ.133 The
Court did so, however, because of the potential risks of harm to the inmates
and to other security personnel should attacks on the female guards occur.
The Court rejected the argument that the risk to the female plaintiffs was
sufficient, stating that
[i]n the usual case, the argument that a particular job is too dangerous
128. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
129. Id. at 416-17. The test adopted by the Court was that developed by the Fifth Circuit
in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) and applied by all other
courts of appeals in addressing the BFOQ issue in a safety context. 472 U.S. at 416. The test
has two parts. First, the qualification standard must be "reasonably necessary to the essence
of" the employer's business. Id. at 413. Second, the employer must establish that either (1) it
had a reasonable cause to believe that substantially all of the employees who did not meet the
age requirement would be unable to perform the job safely and efficiently, or that (2) "age was
a legitimate proxy for the safety-related job qualifications by proving that it is impossible or
highly impractical to deal with the older employees on an individualized basis." Id. at 413-15.
130. See Tullis v. Lear Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1489, 1490 (1 1th Cir. 1989); see also Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (concerning age cutoff for bus drivers
based on safety to passengers and public).
131. See also EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1220-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
889 (1988) (refusing to allow a manufacturer of airplanes to defend on the basis of the FAA's
Age-60 Rule its practice of requiring retirement of its pilots at age 60 since the safety consider-
ations involved in the Age-60 Rule were different because of the substantial number of passen-
gers carried by airlines covered by the Rule).
132. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
133. Id. at 336-37.
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for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the pur-
pose of Title VII to make that choice for herself. More is at stake in
this case, however, than an individual woman's decision to weigh and
accept the risks of employment .... 134
Dothard is illustrative of the policy behind civil rights statutes in general,
that a protected person should be allowed to choose for himself or herself the
risks of employment, absent overriding concern for the safety of third
parties.
Additional support is found in cases where courts have approved layoffs of
pregnant flight attendants when based on passenger safety.13 5 In one of
these cases, Burnwell v. Eastern Airlines,136 the court addressed the argu-
ment that personal risk is a legitimate business concern. In that case, East-
ern Airlines defended its policy of requiring pregnant flight attendants to
take maternity leave after reaching the thirteenth week of pregnancy on the
ground that the policy was justified based on the business necessity of pro-
tecting the pregnant flight attendant, her fetus, and passengers. The court
responded:
Eastern's contention that an element of business necessity is its consid-
eration for the safety of the pregnant flight attendant and her unborn
child is not persuasive. If this personal compassion can be attributed to
corporate policy it is commendable, but in the area of civil rights, per-
sonal risk decisions not affecting business operations are best left to indi-
viduals who are the targets of discrimination. Its contention that the
leave policy is legitimately designed to enhance the safety of passengers
meets with more success. Focusing all the evidence at trial ... demon-
strates that Eastern's policy as it relates to pregnancy after the thir-
134. Id. at 335 (footnotes omitted). In addition Justice Marshall, while disagreeing with
the Court's application but agreeing with the statements of the law regarding the BFOQ de-
fense, noted that the Court properly rejected the arguments based on risk to the female plain-
tiffs. Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "It is simply irrelevant here that a guard's
occupation is dangerous and that some women might be unable to protect themselves ade-
quately." Id. at 341. "[P]ossible harm to women guards is an unacceptable reason for disqual-
ifying women." Id. at 342.
135. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 965 (1981) (policy requiring flight attendants to take leave after 13th week of pregnancy
was justified as a business necessity to enhance safety of passengers); Harriss v. Pan Am.
World Airways Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (since requiring employees to take leave
upon becoming pregnant was reasonably necessary to passenger safety, the essence of the em-
ployer's business, the policy was justified as a BFOQ); Condit v. United Airlines Inc., 558
F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (since pregnancy could incapacitate a flight attendant to such a
degree that the safe operation of the aircraft might be threatened, the policy of requiring leave
upon pregnancy was justified as a BFOQ), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); In re Nat'l Air-
lines Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (restrictions on pregnant flight attendants were
justified based on passenger safety). Regardless of one's position on the substance of these
decisions, that is, whether pregnancy poses a significant risk to others so as to justify the
discrimination approved of, the fact remains that pregnancy has been treated as a disability of
sorts and these cases therefore provide an excellent analogy to the issue at hand. Moreover,
the use of this analogy is not affected by the EEOC's decision that pregnancy is not a disability.
See EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at 35,727. First, the EEOC's decision does not change
the fact that pregnancy has been treated as a disability in the past. Second, it remains to be
seen whether pregnancy will be treated as a non-disability under all circumstances in suits
under the ADA.
136. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
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teenth week results from the legitimate business necessity of safely
transporting passengers. 37
This case clearly supports the proposition that protected employees should
be allowed to make their own decision whether to accept or reject a position
based on the personal risks involved.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. John-
son Controls, Inc. 138 sheds further light on the use of a safety defense based
on risk to protected employees. That case involved the validity under Title
VII of a fetal protection policy implemented by Johnson Controls. The pol-
icy barred all women except those who submitted proof of infertility from
positions involving lead exposure over a certain level. Johnson Controls de-
fended the policy claiming that it was supported as a valid safety precau-
tion.139 The Court, citing both Criswell and Dothard,140 rejected the safety
argument and held that it is an acceptable reason for discrimination only
where "sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to
perform the job."' 141 Only where the "essence" of the business involves
safety obligations to, and the excluded criteria place at risk, third parties
who are "indispensable to the particular business at issue" 142 will the BFOQ
defense based on safety be accepted. This is a far cry from a defense under
ADA based on risk to the disabled individual.
These cases illustrate that risk to self is not a valid consideration under
either Title VII or ADEA. There is no distinguishing characteristic between
Title VII and the ADEA on the one hand and the ADA on the other, that
supports, much less demands, a policy in favor of considering risk to self
under the ADA. On the contrary, the model of equality adopted by the
ADA indicates that, if anything, even more deference should be given to
disabled individuals' decisions as to whether they will assume the risks of a
particular job. The ADA uses the special treatment model of equality, as
opposed to the equal treatment model used in Title VII and ADEA. The
special treatment model recognizes to a greater degree the physical and
mental differences between disabled and nondisabled persons. This recogni-
137. Id. at 371 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
138. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
139. Johnson Controls argued and both the district and appellate courts agreed that the
discrimination was of a disparate impact type rather than disparate treatment and therefore
the business necessity inquiry was proper. Id. at 1200. The Supreme Court held, however,
that the policy was facially discriminatory and thus, the BFOQ defense was the proper one.
Id. at 1204.
140. Id. at 1207. The Court affirmed the dictate of Dothard that "danger to a woman
herself does not justify discrimination." Id. at 1205.
141. Id. at 1206.
142. Id. at 1205. The debate between the majority and Justice White's concurrence fo-
cused on how broadly the phrase should be read. Justice White thought that the term was
wide enough to encompass safety to fetuses as third persons. Id. at 1212 (White, J., concur-
ring). The majority read the phrase more narrowly, noting that "[tihird party safety consider-
ations properly entered into the BFOQ analysis in Dothard and Criswell because they went to
the core of the employee's job performance ... [which] involved the central purpose of the
enterprise." Id. at 1206. Regardless of the outcome, both sides assumed that the individual
employee could assume the risk of personal injury. Id. at 1208, 1211.
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tion evinces a determination on the part of Congress to take greater steps to
protect against discrimination based on those differences. Accordingly,
there is no justification for a safety defense under ADA that is more strin-
gent on protected employees. Rather, the use of the special treatment model
and the case law regarding the safety issue in the context of Title VII and
ADEA serve as additional support that the proper standard under ADA is
one of risk-to-others.
B. RIGHT-TO-KNOW STATUTES AND SELECTION OF RISK
Many states have enacted "right-to-know" statutes, which require em-
ployers to inform employees of risks or potential risks, usually relating to
hazardous substances in the workplace. 143 One purpose of these statutes is
to allow employees to weigh the risks associated with employment and deter-
mine for themselves whether they wish to take those risks. 144 In addition,
safety standards adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) require many employees to be informed of the dangers asso-
ciated with numerous hazardous substances.1 45 Both of these requirements
demonstrate that society favors allowing individuals to choose the workplace
risks that they are willing to tolerate, rather than allowing employers to
choose the risks that a particular individual is allowed to undertake.
Of course, the difference in the context of right-to-know legislation is that
the risk cannot be eliminated. Society has determined that the benefits of the
product outweigh the potential harm it may cause. In the risk-to-self con-
text, however, the risk can be eliminated by enforcement of a rule compara-
ble to the one that the EEOC has adopted. In the first case, the potential
harm is present because of something inherent in the substances to which an
employee is exposed. In the second case, the presence of the risk is caused
by the existence of a disability. In other words, the second case-where the
risk can be eliminated by hiring different persons-will not arise absent a
disability. Therefore, allowing a risk-to-self defense is tantamount to saying,
"If you are 'able-bodied' you have a right to make certain decisions, but if
you are disabled, you must allow society to make those decisions for you."
143. For a list of states that have adopted right-to-know laws, see James T. O'Reilly, Driv-
ing a Soft Bargain: Unions Toxic Materials And Right to Know Legislation, 9 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 307, 309 n.13. (1985).
144. See Frances L. Edwards, Worker Right-To-Know Laws: Ineffectiveness of Current Pol-
icy-Making and Proposed Legislative Solution, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1987).
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a) (1990). For general discussions of right-to-know laws in the
workplace context, see Horace A. Thompson III, Occupational Safety and Health Law, C588
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 449 (1991); Daniel Marcus, OSHA's Expanding Hazard Communication Re-
quirements, 4 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 19 (1990); Nelson A. Clare, Hazardous Chemicals in
the Workplace: The Employer's Obligation to Inform Employees and the Community, 20 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 307 (1989); Arthur J. Marinelli, Jr., Worker Protection and the Law of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1053 (1987); Edwards, supra note
144; Patrick R. Tyson, The Preemptive Effect of the OSHA Hazard Communications Standard
on State and Community Right to Know Laws, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1010 (1987); Ilise L.
Feitshans, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: How Much Does the Employee Have the
"Right to Know"?, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 697 (1985); O'Reilly, supra note 143; James T.
O'Reilly, Right to Know: Cincinnati's More Righteous, Less Knowing Experiment, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 337 (1983).
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This is the same paternalistic attitude that the ADA was intended to elimi-
nate. The fact that, in the context of right-to-know legislation, society has
made a decision that someone will be harmed so that the public may have
the benefits of certain products does not reduce the important statement of
right-to-know statutes: if there is a risk involved in employment, the individ-
ual who will be exposed to that risk, and not the employer, has the right to
decide whether he or she wishes to be exposed to that risk. This right should
not be denied simply because a disability causes a risk to be present. Dis-
abled persons should be afforded the right to select for themselves which
risks they are willing to tolerate.
Indeed, the policy in favor of allowing employees to choose their own
risks is even stronger when those employees are disabled individuals pro-
tected by a federal disability law. The very purpose of a civil rights law is to
eradicate discrimination based on the protected feature. Thus, not only is
there no valid reason for refusing to allow disabled persons the same right as
nondisabled persons to choose the risks associated with employment, there is
every reason to strongly support and protect that right. Allowing employers
to use a risk-to-self defense permits the precise behavior that civil rights leg-
islation is intended to prohibit. The defense fails to treat disabled persons
with equal concern and respect. Thus, the risk-to-self defense is not only
incorrect from a legal point of view, it is indefensible from a moral point of
view.
VI. THE PATERNALISTIC NATURE OF THE RISK-TO-SELF
STANDARD
The House Labor Report states that "[i]t is critical that paternalistic con-
cerns for the disabled person's own safety not be used to disqualify an other-
wise qualified applicant."' 4 6 Furthermore, "employment decisions must not
be based on paternalistic views about what is best for a person with a disabil-
ity. Paternalism is perhaps the most pervasive form of discrimination for
people with disabilities and has been a major barrier to such individuals."'147
The risk-to-self standard is overly paternalistic and should therefore be re-
jected. It allows the employer (and in later stages a court) to substitute its
own judgment for that of the disabled, yet fully competent, individual in
determining the types of risks he or she wishes to assume in an employment
context. A disabled person who desires to take a job, knowing that perform-
ing the duties of the position may well aggravate a current injury or cause a
new injury because of his or her disability should not be questioned in making
the decision, so long as he or she is legally competent.' 48
Paternalism is a topic that has been debated by philosophers and political
146. HOUSE LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at 72; see also SENATE LABOR REPORT, supra
note 41, at 38.
147. Id. at 74.
148. See Tucker, supra note 64, at 899. "To foster the purpose of section 504, as a general
rule handicapped adults should be permitted to decide for themselves whether to accept any
risks inherent in a job .... " Id.
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theorists for centuries. In his classic work, On Liberty,149 John Stuart Mill
took an absolute position against all paternalism. According to Mill, unless
an individual's actions placed another at risk, neither the state nor anyone
else had any authority to prohibit that person from acting, regardless of be-
liefs of his or her best interest. 150 Mill stated that
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient war-
rant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will
be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in
the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visit-
ing him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the con-
duct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce
evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which
he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign. 151
The absolute nature of Mill's position has not, of course, gone unopposed15 2
and it is clear that modern society has not adopted Mill's anti-paternalistic
message. Thus, the question is not whether the EEOC position is incorrect
because it is paternalistic, but whether it is overly paternalistic in the context
of risks to employees in the workplace, particularly with regard to employees
protected by federal civil rights laws.
As the examination of other legislation has shown, competent persons are
generally given the choice of whether to accept or reject a position of em-
ployment based on their own evaluations of personal risk. This is especially
true where the persons are protected by federal civil rights laws.' 53 There-
fore, one need not accept Mill's harm principle in order to find the risk-to-
self standard unacceptable. Rather, one can reject the principle simply be-
cause it is overly paternalistic in the context of what society generally
accepts.
VII. RISK OF TORT LIABILITY TO EMPLOYERS
There is one policy argument in favor of the risk-to-self standard that
should be addressed. It can be argued that an employer may be subject to
149. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., Norton Critical ed. 1975) (1859).
150. Id. at 10-11.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Gearld Dworkin, Paternalism, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 230 (Joel Feinberg et
al. eds., 4th ed. 1991); Gearld Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, in PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 240 (Joel Feinberg et al. eds., 4th ed. 1991); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
249 (1971).
153. See Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
965 (1981). "[In the area of civil rights, personal risk decisions not affecting business opera-
tions are best left to individuals who are the targets of discrimination." Id. at 371.
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liability if a disabled employee is injured on the job and, therefore, to protect
the employer, the disabled individual who poses a risk of future injury to
himself or herself may be denied employment. The response to this argu-
ment is that the employer would not in fact be liable for injuries to an em-
ployee that result from an aggravation of the employee's disability.
In most cases, a disabled employee who is injured on the job would be able
to, and in fact required to, recover for the injuries through the workers'
compensation system. Workers' compensation schemes generally cover ag-
gravation of pre-existing injuries as any other on-the-job injury. 1 54 The only
requirement is that the aggravation or acceleration of the pre-existing injury
be caused by the employees' work. 15 5 Coverage of these injuries should not
change merely because an anti-discrimination statute is enacted. Aggrava-
tion and acceleration of pre-existing injuries have typically been covered,
and should continue to be covered, by state and federal workers' compensa-
tion systems. '5 6
Even if the injured disabled employee was not restricted to recovery under
workers' compensation, it is highly unlikely that recovery could be obtained
in tort, absent some employer negligence that would have resulted in employer
liability in a situation not involving a disabled person. When an employee
sues in tort, the employer will have assumption of the risk or a similar doc-
trine as a defense, as well as contributory negligence.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue tangentially in Johnson Con-
trols.'5 7 The Court discussed whether an employer is liable for prenatal inju-
ries to a fetus. The injuries could result from pregnant females' exposure to
lead even though an employer could not, under Title VII, exclude those wo-
men from lead-exposure jobs. The Court stated:
If, under general tort principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protec-
tion policies, if the employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and if
the employer has not acted negligently, then the basis for holding an
employer liable seems remote at best.158
154. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.21 (1990).
155. Id.
156. Several cases illustrate that coverage by workers' compensation is typical. See, e.g.,
Crum v. General Adjustment Bureau, 738 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(angina pain exacerbated
by work compensable); Gardner v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 640
F.2d 1385 (1st Cir. 1981)(varicose veins aggravated by work held compensable); Potenza v.
United Terminals, Inc., 524 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1975)(cancer of the jaw aggravated when fall-
ing carton hit employee's jaw held compensable); Lambert's Point Docks, Inc. v. Harris, 718
F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1983)(back injury aggravated by employee's spina bifida and osteoporosis
that made employee more susceptible to injury held compensable); Martin Indus., Inc. v. De-
ment, 435 So. 2d 85 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983)(aggravation of rheumatoid arthritis compensable);
Pezzolanti v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 114 A.D.2d 553, 494 N.Y.S.2d 168 (App. Div. 1985)(ag-
gravation of wrist tumor by trauma compensable); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Beardon, 700
S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ)(congenital disease that caused employee's em-
physema and bronchia asthma aggravated by repeated exposure to chicken feed and chicken
dust held compensable); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Murphy, 506 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (pneumonia caused by aggravation of preex-
isting bronchitis and emphysema by inhalation of lead and zinc fumes compensable).
157. International Union, United States Automobile, Aerospace and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
158. Id. at 1208.
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RISK OF FUTURE INJURY
Furthermore, if state tort principles did allow for recovery when the injury is
caused by compliance with Title VII, the court indicated that the state law
then would be preempted.1 59
Although the foregoing language in Johnson Controls was dicta, it pro-
vides a valid response to employer concerns about the risk-to-self standard
that are based on potential tort liability. If the disabled employee is fully
informed about the risk of future injury and the employer has not been negli-
gent but, to the contrary, has acted in compliance with the clear language of
the ADA, the employer should not be held liable under state tort law. If
state tort law would allow recovery, then the state law action should be pre-
empted by the ADA.16° However, if the injury is one which would have
been suffered regardless of the disability, it is a different issue and the em-
ployer will be liable to the same extent as if the plaintiff-employee was not
disabled. 161
VIII. CONCLUSION
Ample evidence exists to show that Congress has expressed its intent re-
garding the determination of the precise issue at hand. That issue is whether
the term "direct threat" or the safety defense based on a qualification stan-
dard includes a risk-to-self standard. The plain language of the ADA in
defining the terms "direct threat" and "qualification standard" as referring
to a risk to others demonstrates the exclusion of the risk-to-self standard. If
a term is defined as applying to X, it is not ambiguous as to whether that
term applies to Y; it does not apply. 162 Under the Chevron rule,163 therefore,
courts are required to adhere to this intent and to reject the EEOC interpre-
tation. Even if this statute is ambiguous on the risk-to-self issue, the legisla-
tive history combined with the express language make clear Congress'
intention to include a risk-to-others standard and to exclude a risk-to-self
159. Id. at 1209. "When it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state and
federal requirements, this Court has ruled that federal law pre-empts that of the States." Id
(citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)); see also
Farmers Union Educ. and Coop. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 531 (1959)(Federal Communi-
cations Act provision, which prevented censorship, preempted state libel action against radio
station that broadcasted speech in compliance with the Act).
160. The "non-preemption" provision of the EEOC Regulations does not foreclose the pos-
sibility of preemption under these circumstances. In fact, the EEOC Regulations make clear
that while the ADA does not preempt a state law with consistent obligations, it does preempt
state laws that impose obligations inconsistent with the ADA. "An employer allegedly in
violation of this part cannot successfully defend its actions by relying on the obligation to
comply with the requirements of any state or local law." EEOC Final Rule, supra note 13, at
35,740.
161. There are numerous issues concerning insurance which arise under the ADA, none of
which are within the scope of this Comment. For example, are caps on AIDS insurance cover-
age discriminatory? If an employer fails to provide an employee with reasonable accommoda-
tion and the employee is injured as a result, can the employee sue in tort, or must he or she rely
on the workers' compensation system to remedy the situation? A development which remains
to be seen is the effect of ADA on the already troubled state workers' compensation schemes.
162. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). "Affirmative words are
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a
negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all." Id.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
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standard. Therefore, the EEOC's interpretation fails as exceeding the
agency's authority and its construction must be rejected by the courts.
In addition to the contrary intent expressed in the statute and the legisla-
tive history, the risk-to-self standard is not fully supported by the case law
developed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. When these factors are
coupled with the policy arguments against a risk-to-self standard and the
policy adopted in other federal civil rights statutes, the preferred course of
action is clear: the EEOC should change its position. If this action is not
taken, courts must refuse to follow the regulations and instead must follow
the plain language and clear meaning of the ADA.
